Account Managers Creation of Social Capital: Communal and Instrumental Investments and Performance Implications by Verbeke, W.J.M.I. (Willem) et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Communal a
Willem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT 
ERIM Report Seri
Publication  
Number of pages
Email address co
Address 
 
Bibliographic Account Managers Creation of Social Capital: 
nd Instrumental Investments and Performance Implications 
 
Verbeke, Frank Belschak, Stefan Wuyts and Richard P. Bagozzi    
 SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
es reference number ERS-2004-011-MKT 
January 2004 
 42 
rresponding author verbeke@few.eur.nl 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
Rotterdam School of Management / Rotterdam School of 
Economics  
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
P.O. Box 1738  
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  +31 10 408 1182  
Fax: +31 10 408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl 
data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
Abstract Account managers invest in two distinct, compensatory social ties to achieve social capital, 
namely peripheral knowledge ties and implementation support ties. The first ties require 
communal investments, which consist of organizational citizenship behaviors and peripheral 
information sharing. The second ties require instrumental investments that encompass 
reciprocity norms and strategic information sharing. Hypotheses are tested on a sample of 164 
account managers who sell financial products/services to large customers. The findings show 
that account managers invest in both ties to attain peripheral knowledge accretion and 
implementation support which in turn result in improved performance. 
5001-6182 Business 
5410-5417.5 Marketing 
Library of Congress 
Classification  
(LCC) HF 5438.8K48 Sales management: key accounts 
M Business Administration and Business Economics  
M 31 
C 44 
Marketing 
Statistical Decision Theory 
Journal of Economic 
Literature  
(JEL) 
M 31 Marketing 
85 A Business General 
280 G 
255 A 
Managing the marketing function 
Decision theory (general) 
European Business Schools 
Library Group  
(EBSLG) 
290 S Selling 
Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) 
85.00 Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen 
85.40 
85.03 
Marketing 
Methoden en technieken, operations research 
Classification GOO 
85.40 Marketing 
Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie 
Marketing / Besliskunde 
Keywords GOO 
Account management, Human capital, prestatiebeoordeling 
Free keywords Account management, social capital, organizational citizenship behaviors, reciprocity 
 
 
 Account Managers Creation of Social Capital: 
Communal and Instrumental Investments and Performance Implications1 
 
 
 
 
 
Willem Verbeke a 
Frank Belschak a 
Stefan Wuyts a 
Richard P. Bagozzi b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a School of Economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
b Jesse H. Jones School of Management and Department of Psychology, Rice University, Houston, TX, 
USA 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 correspondence should be addressed to: Richard P. Bagozzi; Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of 
Management, 6100 Main Street, MS-531; Rice University, Houston, Texas, 77005-1892, USA; 
phone: 713-348-6307; fax:  713-348-5251; email: bagozzi@rice.edu 
1 
  
Account Managers Creation of Social Capital: 
Communal and Instrumental Investments and Performance Implications 
 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Account managers invest in two distinct, compensatory social ties to achieve social capital, 
namely peripheral knowledge ties and implementation support ties. The first ties require 
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Introduction 
Successful account management depends on two different sorts of roles or tasks. First, 
based upon their observation and assessment of customer needs, account managers sketch a 
frame or vision for products that matches customer needs; second, they need to implement this 
vision such that a final quality product arrives in time at the customer’s premises. These two 
tasks are known, respectively, as product strategy formation and strategy implementation, and 
they are thought to require different resources and skills (Mittall, Ross, and Tsiros 2002). These 
tasks or roles are for (some) account managers not easy to blend or harmonize (Bonoma 1985). 
For the product strategy development part, such analysis and planning steps as understanding 
customer needs and translating them into product solutions are key, whereas for implementation, 
premium is placed upon enactment of practical details and getting the job done on time (Bonoma 
1985; Noble and Mokwa 1999). Within organizations, account managers need to gain the 
support of their firm’s employees, but they do not have the authority to direct the employee’s 
activities (Weitz and Bradford 1999, p. 250), and consequently they need social capital, if they 
want to reach their performance goals. Social capital (Adler & Kwon 2002) is the actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from relationships 
possessed by an individual within his/her organization (see also Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1999, p. 
120). Little is known on how account managers achieve social capital (e.g., Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001). The goal of this paper is to investigate how account managers gain social 
capital within their organization.   
To carry out these queries, we build on the extant social capital literature (e.g., Bourdieu 
1980; Coleman 1988). First, we distinguish between two different dimensions of social capital, 
namely peripheral knowledge accretion versus implementation support. Second, we explore the 
antecedents of social capital, specifically the motivated investments people make in colleagues 
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to attain their resources. Third and finally, we also explore whether possession of social capital 
has consequences: we explore the performance of the account manager.  
Account managers’ role within firms  
Account managers operate as boundary spanners within their organization. They also play 
a key role in the creation of value for the customer that takes place at the periphery of the 
company (Weitz and Bradford 1999; Sawhney and Parikh 2001). Value creation implies the 
ability to mobilize specific sets of resources -- which include skills (such as making contracts) 
and expertise (such as knowledge of financial products) -- from colleagues who operate within 
one’s department or across extended institutional communities throughout the firm, such that 
tailor-made products or bundles of offerings can be produced that fit customers’ needs and 
enhance profitability (Weitz and Bradford 1999).  
To a certain extent, this bridging function of the account manager makes his/her colleagues 
resource dependent: account managers become the translators or information brokers for 
customer needs within their firm, and colleagues depend on the account manager’s vision, if 
they are to perform their professional roles effectively (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Galaskiewicz 
1985). However, making others resource dependent is but one part of the story. Account 
managers also face challenges, because they must socially construct a clear and attractive vision 
so that they can woo colleagues to share resources. Yet the consequences of any customer vision 
must not stretch the capabilities of the company too much, as the aim is to stimulate the 
development of procedures and routines that in the end secure profits for the organization 
(Cespedes 1995, chapter 7). This tension is inherent in marketing (Flint, Woodruff, and Fisher 
Gardial 2002), and it can be reduced through developing a vision that matches customers’ 
idiosyncratic needs and the capabilities of the firm. Therefore account managers need to access 
two sorts of resources: information on organizational practices (to take the organization’s 
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capabilities and strategy into account) and time and implementation support from colleagues (to 
serve the customer’s needs).  
Consider first strategy factors. Account managers need a deep understanding of the 
strategy being implemented; both in its particular significance to the organization and in its fit 
with the broader strategic vision of the firm (Noble and Mowka’s 1999, p. 71; Weitz and 
Bradford 1999). These strategies are embodied in a range of stories, narratives, and metaphors 
that epitomize different, yet relatively coherent, perspectives about the organization. They 
mainly come indirectly to life, when employees discuss how certain (new) incidents or 
behaviors ought to be regulated (Bannon and Kutti 1996). Using different stories and metaphors 
during such discussions, colleagues heedfully delineate what behaviors are permissible, what 
behaviors should be avoided, and possibly dissonant ideas might be vented accordingly. When 
account managers become aware of these stories, narratives, and metaphors, it increases the 
chances that they will be better able to envision products for their customers, such that they 
conform to the capabilities of their firm. Such social construction of knowledge within firms has 
been emphasized by Tsoukas and Hatch (2001), Weick (1995), and, specifically for marketing 
organizations, Rosa et al. (1999). Account managers access the knowledge stored in narratives, 
stories, and metaphors via information ties, that is, social ties with other people in the firm that 
provide them with narratives and stories about the organization. These ties are typically 
embedded in and targeted across different divisions within the organization (Walsh and Ungson 
1991).  
Time and implementation support from colleagues are the second class of resources. 
Account managers are under pressure to reach sales quotas. To succeed, they need to convince 
colleagues from different departments to share their skills and expertise (Noble and Mokwa 
1999), such that a tailor-made product/service can be implemented in an efficient and speedy 
fashion (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1996). The implementation of a product vision is conceived as a 
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weaving together of different skills and resources possessed by colleagues. Such an activity 
requires continuously searching for and connecting to colleagues, because customers differ in 
needs, resources, and responsiveness (see also Brown and Duguid 1991; Lave and Wenger 1991; 
Weick and Roberts 1993). An account manager therefore needs to tap into the scarce time and 
attention of colleagues who possess these skills and expertise, but at the same time s/he 
competes with other account managers who have similar intentions in relation to other 
customers or other products the firm may sell (Mittal et al. 2002). It is vital that account 
managers not limit their relationships with departments through formal rules and procedures 
(Noble and Mokwa 1999). Rather, they should forge ties with specific colleagues within these 
departments who possess specific abilities, competencies, and resources (Weitz and Bradford 
1999; Achrol and Kotler 1999). Some colleagues, for instance, might possess more expertise 
than others, while still others might be more willing to work with one person than with someone 
else. Account managers seek to cooperate with people via what is termed, implementation 
support ties or internal coalitions (Anderson 1982), i.e., social ties with colleagues in the firm 
that are willing to work with them and support them in their efforts to produce high quality 
products that satisfy customer needs. Implementation support ties are carefully targeted and 
nurtured because of the special care and weighty time allocation that are often required from 
colleagues where complex, discretionary inputs are needed for full cooperation. 
Although firms might introduce account management systems (e.g., Homburg, Workman, 
and Jensen 2002), that is, explicit guidelines for account managers on how to practice value 
creation within the firm, the value creation process in and of itself is intricate, uncertain in 
operation, and often marked by informal processes, so the level of specification and organization 
needs to be flexible and responsive to changing demands and constraints (e.g., Grewal and 
Tansuhaj 2001). Account managers therefore need information ties and implementation support 
ties with different colleagues in different departments. Everyday communication in such ties is 
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generally intense and richly textured, such that considerable emphasis is placed on face-to-face 
interactions, in addition to mediated contact, and nonverbal communication skills often 
accompany and facilitate the more rational side of give and take. Social capital -- possessing 
social relationships from which one can mobilize resources -- promotes such informal and 
complex interactions as we develop below (e.g., Kostova and Roth 2003, p. 300). 
Social capital as a lubricant for resource sharing  
As Adler and Kwon (2002) point out, a personal orientation of goodwill to share resources 
is the substance of social capital: colleagues a) share peripheral information -- mostly in the 
form of stories, narratives, and metaphors, especially concerning the way the organization 
implicitly wants their employees to operate when in contact with customers -- and b) they 
provide implementation support, which is defined as detailed information about and actual help 
in solving a problem of the customer, a focal task of account management. Account managers 
cultivate such goodwill of colleagues; specifically they make investments in their social ties 
(hence, these may be perceived as antecedents of social capital), and they disperse favors and 
gifts, provide emotional support, and disclose information to colleagues.  
These investments by account managers are motivated, and we distinguish two different 
motivations in this study: one is communal-based, the second is individual and instrumentally 
based (Portes, 1998). The two motivations reflect psychological needs for affiliation and for 
achievement, respectively (Bacharach, Bamberger, and McKinney 2000; Bakan 1966). Based 
upon communal motivations, account managers enmesh themselves socially within the 
organization (Bacharach et al. 2000), making colleagues more generously, yet subtly, inclined to 
share peripheral information than would be expected in relationships based solely on formal 
criteria. Second, based upon instrumental motivations, account managers signal reciprocity 
norms to some colleagues, which builds a climate of expectations with regard to mutual 
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exchanges. This functions to establish colleagues as partners who are primed to reciprocate 
information, resources, and support. 
Communal-based investments  
As a consequence of their communal motivation, account managers make communal-
based investments, that is, they engage in particular prosocial activities that foster a communal 
atmosphere. One way that employees enmesh themselves within their organizations so as to 
foster informal social ties is through their engagement in organizational citizenship behaviors 
(OCBs). OCBs are actions employees take that are neither expected nor part of the job-
description, per se, but that nevertheless directly promote the welfare of colleagues and 
indirectly benefit the overall character of the organization (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter 
1993; Organ and Paine 1999), particularly through stimulating a willingness to share 
information (e.g., Bolino, Turnley, and Bloodgood 2002; Kalman, Monge, Fulk, & Heino 2002; 
Constant, Sproull and Kiesler 1996). True or sincere OCBs spring from a personal virtuous 
orientation or a sense of obligation or gratitude toward the organization and are affected by job 
satisfaction (Bolino 1999; Brief 1998; Organ and Paine 1999). OCBs promote a positive 
atmosphere within a social environment (Portes 1998; Putnam 1993), strengthening information 
sharing and cooperation. We explore how four dimensions of OCBs displayed by account 
managers affect peripheral information sharing (i.e., sharing of knowledge about the firm in the 
form of stories, narratives, and metaphors) by colleagues in their social ties: civic virtue, 
sportsmanship, helping, and courteousness.  
Civic virtue involves active participation in such everyday company activities as attending 
meetings, responding to messages in a timely fashion, and keeping up with company affairs 
(McKenzie et al. 1991; Organ and Paine 1999). Engagement in civic virtue enlarges one’s ties, 
as contact with employees across departments typically occurs (Bolino et al. 2002). The 
opportunity for unplanned revelations and sharing of information that occur in such settings lead 
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to serendipitous accretions of knowledge and opportunities for reciprocity. Certain types of 
knowledge are dependent on interactions between people for their quality, relevance, and 
appropriateness (Bannon and Kutti 1996). Sportsmanship implies enduring frustration, minor 
slights, and inconvenience not only without complaint but with a positive, upbeat attitude. 
Taylor and Aspinwall (1996) show that people with a more positive (as opposed to negative) 
outlook on their organization more easily develop social bonds. At the same time, the expression 
of positive emotions in the face of set-backs and discouragement is thought to be contagious and 
promotive of healthy ties (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). To the extent that account 
managers create a positive atmosphere, it is hoped that spontaneity can be encouraged and frank 
and open discussion will occur. Helping is the willingness to come to the aid of colleagues in 
terms of everyday support as well as in regard to burdensome workloads. Altruism in this regard 
builds trust, reinforces organizational identification, and promotes useful disclosures through the 
sharing of narratives (Bolino et al. 2002). Courteousness refers to efforts at creating a pleasant 
social climate and avoiding negativism in interpersonal exchanges. Courteousness implies the 
ability to take the perspective of and empathize with others. By considering the implications of 
their demeanor and actions on others, account managers promote a narrative of kindness and 
consideration, which complements more formal narratives rooted in job descriptions (Tsoukas 
and Hatch 2001). Courteous account managers are forthcoming, respectfully responsive, and 
share stories and metaphors with others (peripheral information sharing). Such upbringing of 
narratives and stories about the organization by the account manager might help in creating a 
communal atmosphere and stimulates colleagues to act similarly, by telling their own stories and 
narratives back to the account manager. Similarly, psychologists note that self-disclosures create 
closer relationships and leads to self-disclosures by interaction partners (Jourard 1971; Jourard 
and Jaffe 1970). In this regard, peripheral information sharing by account managers might elicit 
peripheral information sharing from others. 
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In sum, engaging in communal investments produce three effects, as summarized in the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a. The more account managers engage in OCBs, the more they share 
peripheral information with colleagues.  
Hypothesis 1b. The more account managers engage in OCBs, the more peripheral 
knowledge they gain from colleagues.  
Hypothesis 1c. The more account managers share peripheral information with their 
colleagues, the more peripheral knowledge they gain from colleagues. 
 
It is important to point out that such communal investments as described above, based on 
OCBs, are not so much the products of rational calculations as they are implicit or unplanned 
dividends accruing from everyday opportunities to express and enact one’s caring for colleagues 
with whom one frequently interacts (e.g., Bolino et al., 2002). Nevertheless, account mangers 
can learn and be coached to a certain extent to offer and be receptive to gestures of support and 
caring, and the organization culture can be shaped to acknowledge and reward such 
participation. Information exchanged in such environments are not done in a quid pro quo 
manner, per se, but rather happen more or less spontaneously and as a consequence of the 
orientations of people to the human welfare of others (cf. Adler and Kwon 2002).  
We turn now to a more purposive orientation that complements communal investments, 
especially in such strongly corporate goal-oriented endeavors as account management. 
Instrumentally motivated investments  
Implementation support is the strategic allocation of scarce time and resources to projects 
initiated by account managers, and it is achieved via implementation ties. For account managers 
to receive desired time and resources of colleagues, the literature suggests that they must be 
mindful of two principles. First, colleagues must incur costs to accrue any gains (Nahapiet and 
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Ghoshal 1998). Second, a climate of understanding must exist based on mechanisms of 
reciprocity (Axelrod 1984; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Such instrumental orientations are 
needed in account management contexts, because account managers require the cooperation of 
different people to fulfill their objectives, yet they have no authority or formal mechanisms to 
compel or elicit such cooperation in many instances, given their boundary-spanning roles. 
Strategic investments in this paper reflect a combination of two specific characteristics for 
providing information. Information can be made scarce by leaking out or rationing information 
(for instance about a customer or internal developments) or by careful segmentation and 
disbursement of information to only some colleagues but not others. In this regard economists 
refer to similar mechanisms as “richness of information” (Evans and Wurster 2000) or 
“versioning” (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Giving specified versions of information to particular 
people in one’s set of connections enhances the value of such information (as it is scarce), 
compared to when all information is shared with everyone. Shapiro and Varian (1999) elaborate 
on the versioning approach to sharing information by arguing that, if information is not 
versioned and/or made available to only particular people, its value tends to be diminished. 
Providing versioned information (strategic information sharing) (a) creates a distinctive identity 
for the donor within his/her firm (e.g., Hansen and Haas 2001) and (b) makes the recipient 
resource-dependent (e.g., Pfeffer 1992). Account managers function typically as “go-betweens” 
and thus are in a strategic position to selectively leak information in their firms. By providing a 
clear vision or frame for expectations, they create a platform so as to better weave together 
needed skills and expertise of colleagues (see Noble and Mokwa 1999, for a similar position). 
This gives account managers the ability to exploit their unique position to ration information that 
is to their own advantage and to omit communicating information that might run counter to their 
goals (see Webster 1992; Hagardon and Sutton 1997; Perry-Smith and Shalley 2003). 
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Because reciprocity norms are in general diffuse and tacit, account managers must find 
ways to create a climate that safeguards their own strategic investments; by doing so, they 
promote their instrumental motivations. Safeguarding takes place in two ways. First, account 
managers must signal the value of their strategic information sharing to colleagues in their 
network. Second, they must do so in a way that elicits reciprocity from their colleagues 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1992). Account managers therefore attempt to impute their own private 
“exchange norms” (MacNeil 1980) or “exchange ideology” (Eisenberger, et al. 2001) onto 
recipients. By doing so, they attain a reputation of goal-directedness and toughness. This 
reputation is generally cultivated as a contingent one in the sense that it becomes evident 
typically only when an interaction partner fails to fulfill expectations or understandings held by 
an account manager (Ostrom 2003). Indeed, recipients who do not reciprocate by providing their 
expertise and skills to account managers risk punishment (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Frank 1988). 
Yet, at the same time, account managers create reputations of a willingness to be forthcoming 
and initiate giving. As account managers seek to build implementation support ties, they must be 
willing to take the initiative and give first so as to set the stage for mutual reciprocity in the 
instrumental way that they envision to accomplish their goals. The private reciprocity norms 
proposed in this paper mirror Axelrod’s (1984) well-known rule of ‘tit-for-tat’. That is, it is 
posited that account managers first share strategic information, but if colleagues do not 
reciprocate in the desired way, they may be explicitly excluded from receiving certain favors or 
information the next time around. Such instrumental strategies are also known as “reciprocal 
altruism” (Trivers 1971) or “weak reciprocation” (Fichman 2003) in the literature. In the event 
of recipients “cheating”, the expression of reciprocity rules by account managers functions as 
costly signals to recipients. Once account managers express their own reciprocity norms, they 
set the stage for their mediation of benefits and the unfolding of a network based on strategic 
investments. 
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Two mechanisms work to elicit reciprocation of instrumentally motivated investments: (a) 
giving per se stimulates reciprocation (Cialdini 2001) and (b) reciprocation is imputed via 
signaling of exchange norms. Such exchanges of benefits are expected to foster greater support 
in the form of implementation efforts on the part of network partners. That which stimulates 
strategic sharing by account managers at the same time induces their colleagues to share 
implementation support. Thus  
Hypothesis 2a. The more account managers express reciprocity norms, the more they 
strategically share information with their colleagues. 
Hypothesis 2b. The more account managers express reciprocity norms, the more 
implementation support they obtain from their colleagues. 
Hypothesis 2c. The more account managers strategically share information with 
colleagues, the more these colleagues provide implementation support. 
The relation between information and implementation ties  
So far we have discussed investments influencing the attainment of peripheral knowledge 
and implementation support from colleagues, respectively. In what follows, we argue that 
factors affecting access to peripheral information do not aid in attaining implementation support 
and vice versa. This highlights the distinctive characteristics of both types of social capital. In 
contrast, we further argue that the two types of social capital do affect each other (see Figure 1 
below). 
Communal investments and implementation ties  
As implementation support asks of colleagues their scarce time resources, we do not 
expect that sharing peripheral information with colleagues will directly increase account 
managers’ implementation support. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue in this regard that 
employees typically are not willing to share their valued time without getting adequate 
compensation. Peripheral information may not be considered adequate compensation, because it 
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is shared with, and available to, everybody in the organization, thus having limited value (e.g., 
Shapiro and Varian 1999). OCBs are not likely to directly trigger implementation support either. 
Implementation support -- as opposed to peripheral information sharing -- involves heavy time 
commitments and also requires special attention and the setting of priorities by colleagues (in 
this regard, Davenport and Beck 2001, refer to attention allocation as a form of currency). The 
interpersonal exchanges that account managers create via OCBs, which are normally conducive 
for the sharing of peripheral information, should not directly affect the willingness of colleagues 
to provide implementation support, because the commitment required is generally quite high. In 
fact, in extreme cases, the more account managers engage in OCBs, the less they might be able 
to focus on their core task, which is the implementation of product strategies (e.g., Bolino et al. 
2002). Over-engagement in civic virtue or helping, for instance, might cause account managers 
to be side-tracked from working to satisfy customer needs and weaving together the expertise 
and skills needed by colleagues to develop quality products, which is itself a highly involving 
process. For instance, Noble and Mokwa (1999) show that managers who are committed to the 
organisation or sought to enlarge the scope of their implementation efforts were less effective in 
their implementation performance.  
Instrumental investments and information ties 
Expressing and enforcing reciprocity norms requires specific actions on the part of the 
account manager. During such purposive interactions, colleagues are unlikely to bring up 
narratives and stories (peripheral information) that reflect general organizational practices, 
because they should perceive this information as unimportant or ineffective in triggering 
reciprocation by account managers. After all, peripheral information is readily available to 
everyone and of little instrumental value (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In addition, peripheral 
information exchange is largely the product of the positive social climate in the relationship, 
thus being stimulated only indirectly through communal norms rather than through tit-for-tat 
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norms. As for the sharing of strategic information, such behavior might even be a handicap for 
attaining peripheral knowledge. That is, because account managers selectively build social 
bonds, especially in the purposive implementation of ties by the account manager, those 
excluded might feel ostracized or even envious not to be included. Therefore interaction partners 
might not be willing to bring up certain narratives or stories, thus limiting the perspective that 
account managers can attain. The exclusion of colleagues potentially conflicts with the aim of 
creating an open positive atmosphere needed to foster information sharing within social 
environments (e.g., Hatfield et al. 1994; Bolino et al. 2002). 
Appropriability and convertability of social capital 
Although the antecedents of the information and the implementation ties are clearly 
distinct, researchers note that different forms of social capital created for one purpose may 
influence or provide a source of valuable resources for other purposes (Adler and Kwon 2002; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This is known as the argument of “appropriable social 
organization” (Coleman 1988). Different configurations of social bonds may be interrelated in 
that they may (to a certain extent) serve each other’s goals. Similarly, Bourdieu (1980) argues 
that social capital is convertible into different kinds of capital. Analogous to this argument, we 
assert that one type of social capital (e.g., that found in peripheral information ties) is 
convertible into another type of social capital (e.g., that found in implementation support ties). 
In Coleman’s terminology, one type of social capital is available for appropriation for other 
purposes. More specifically, on the one hand, account managers that benefit from colleagues’ 
goodwill to share peripheral information with them may find it easier to identify candidates that 
may provide them with implementation support. On the other hand, working with colleagues 
results in the acquisition of stories and metaphors of the organization (Bolino et al., 2002). The 
more managers are surrounded by, and hence communicate with, colleagues that provide them 
with implementation support, the more likely they will pick up these narratives. We therefore 
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expect that peripheral knowledge accretion and implementation support enhance one another 
and therefore communal and instrumental investments, respectively, have direct and indirect 
effects on peripheral knowledge transfer and implementation support (see Figure 1). This leads 
us to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3. Peripheral knowledge accretion affects implementation support positively 
and vice versa. 
Consequences of social capital  
Researchers on social capital (Ibarra 1992; Adler and Kwon 2002; Woodcock 1998) argue 
that people in organizations should keep a balance between different sorts of social capital as 
both allow people to accomplish their goals. Specifically, the peripheral knowledge accretion 
that happens allows them to make decisions that fit the capabilities of the firm. They will come 
to frame customer needs more in terms of the fit with their own firm rather than the other way 
around. By learning about the way things are done, account managers also can better seek the 
proper help from colleagues, interpret their behaviors more accurately, and build a 
knowledgeable base for future transactions (Bolino et al. 2002, p. 511). Similarly, account 
managers that are able to attain implementation support from colleagues should be more capable 
of matching customer expectations, that is, bringing products to customers on time and with 
desired standards of quality such that value can be created for customers. 
It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply that the organization will be better 
off, but only that account managers’ individual performance will tend to be better as a 
consequence of enhanced information transfer and implementation support. It is possible that 
some account managers will compete for colleague’s resources to the detriment of other account 
managers. We therefore limit our hypothesis to effects on the performance of individual account 
managers: 
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Hypothesis 4. The greater the account managers’ peripheral knowledge and 
implementation support, the higher the performance. 
Method  
Participants and Procedure 
The questionnaires were given to 96 Dutch account managers who participated in an 
executive education program on sales and account management. All account managers worked 
in big companies in the financial products/services sector, being responsible for managing few 
large accounts. Each manager was asked to randomly distribute the questionnaires to five of 
their colleagues. One hundred sixty four account managers returned the questionnaires, for a 
34% response rate. In exchange for their participation, account managers received a gift worth 
about 12 US dollars. The sample may be described as follows: a majority (about 77 %) of the 
account managers were men, about 30% were younger than 30 years in age, 45% were between 
30 and 40 years old inclusive, 15% between 41 and 50 years old inclusive, and 10% older than 
50 years. With respect to experience, 28% had been with the company less than 2 years, 38% 
between 2 and 6 years inclusive, 23% between 7 and 20 years inclusive, and 11% for 21 years or 
more. Finally, 82% had finished basic and advanced vocational studies, while 18% had a 
university degree. 
Measures 
Social capital. In accordance with recent conceptualizations of social capital (e.g., Adler 
and Kwon 2002; Kostova and Roth 2003), we operationalized social capital in terms of the 
benefits that stem from an actor’s social ties. More specifically, we distinguish between access 
to information and access to implementation support. Peripheral knowledge accretion was 
measured by 3 items (e.g., "When I ask for it, others in my organization easily provide me 
knowledge about their specific department”; all items presented herein are translated from the 
Dutch).  Implementation support was also measured by 3 items (e.g., " I can get the more 
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influential people in my organization around me to get projects done"). The full set of all items 
used in the study can be found in the Appendix. 
Antecedents of social capital. As for the investments of account managers in terms of 
information sharing, two items were used to measure the sharing of peripheral information with 
colleagues (e.g., “I easily share the information that I obtain about my organization with most of 
my colleagues”) and 3 items for the sharing of strategic information (e.g., “I share information 
with my colleagues to facilitate the realization of my ideas”). Drawing upon the research of 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and Portes (1998), we identified two motivations for account 
managers to share information: one is communal based (i.e., organizational citizenship 
behaviors), the second is instrumentally based (i.e., communication of reciprocity norms). The 
motivations reflect human psychological needs for affiliation and for achievement, respectively 
(Bakan 1966). The measures for the communication of reciprocity norms are motivated by the 
work of Eisenberger et al. (2001) and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998). They refer to account 
managers’ efforts to signal an instrumental tit-for-tat orientation to their colleagues and consist 
of three items (e.g., “I am known as the ‘deal-maker’ within my organization”). The measures of 
organizational citizenship behaviors were adopted from MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter 
(1991) and Podsakoff and MacKenzie (1994): (1) civic virtue, i.e., behaviors that indicate that 
the salesperson participates in the life of the organization, was measured with 3 items (e.g., “I 
suggest improvements for procedures and practices of the company”), (2) sportsmanship, i.e., 
the willingness to tolerate less-than ideal circumstances without complaining, was measured 
with 4 items (e.g., “I always look on the bright side of the matter”), (3) helping, i.e., voluntary 
actions to offer support or come to the aid of another person with work-related problems, was 
measured by 3 items (e.g., “I help colleagues who have heavy work loads”), and finally (4) 
courtesy, i.e., actions that anticipate or help prevent work-related problems with others, was 
measured by 4 items (e.g., “I consider the impact of my actions on others”). 
18 
Performance. For measuring account managers’ performance, we adapted a scale from 
Behrman and Perreault (1984), which measures different types of sales performance and consists 
of 7 items (e.g., “Compared to the average account manager in the firm, I sell products with a 
high profitability"). 
Responses for all items were obtained on 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) ‘very low’ 
to (7) ‘very high’. 
Analytic Methods 
To test the proposed factor structure, as well as convergent and discriminant validity of the 
above measures of constructs, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The relationships 
between antecedents of social capital, social capital proper, and performance were tested by use 
of structural equation models. The AMOS 4 program was employed in this regard (Arbuckle 
1999). The goodness-of-fit of the models was assessed with chi-square tests, the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the incremental 
fit index (IFI). Discussions of these indices can be found in Bentler (1990), Browne and Cudeck 
(1993), and Marsh, Balla, and Hau (1996). Because 35 items were used as measures, we 
combined items into parcels so as to yield two indicators for each latent variable. This was done 
for those scales with 4 or more items and whose properties have been tested extensively in past 
research and reported elsewhere; that is, this was done for the four organizational citizenship 
behaviors and the performance scale. For the social capital scales and the instrumental 
motivation scale, we used the individual items as indicators. This meant that we used a type of 
“partial disaggregation” model for our test of the CFA, as recommended by Bagozzi and 
Edwards (1998), which yields a satisfactory ratio of sample size to parameters to be estimated. It 
should be mentioned that, with respect to the interpretation of the findings to follow, the items 
for sportsmanship are reverse coded in accordance with the original version of the scale. This 
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means, therefore, that relationships between this variable and the other organizational citizenship 
behaviors should be negative. 
Results  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlation coefficients 
for the latent constructs. For the test of the CFA, the fit indices show that the proposed model 
fits satisfactorily: χ2 (207) = 339.50 (p=.00), CFI=.91, IFI=.91, RMSEA=.06. The factor 
loadings were consistently high: peripheral knowledge accretion (.74 to .89), implementation 
support (.66 to.89), peripheral information sharing (.74 and .83), strategic information sharing 
(.57 to .75), instrumental motivation (ranging from .51 to .72), civic virtue (.64 to .72), 
sportsmanship (.68 to .91), helping (.73 to .82), courtesy (.70 to .91), and performance (.77 to 
.86). Table 1 reveals further that the intercorrelations among the factors are only low to 
moderately high (ranging from -.32 to .47), and the confidence intervals suggest that 
discriminant validity has been achieved. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 Figure 1 summarizes the findings for hypothesized paths, where only the paths among 
latent variables are shown for simplicity. This model fits the data very well:  χ2(23)=30.95, 
p=.12, CFI=.97, NNFI=.94, and RMSEA=.05. 
 Looking first at the results for communal investments, we see that courtesy has a positive 
effect on peripheral information sharing (γ=0.60, t=4.02), and both civic virtue (γ=0.27, t=2.41) 
and sportsmanship (γ=-.022, t=-3.24) affect peripheral knowledge transfer. Thus, support is 
found for hypotheses H1a and H1b. Contrary to H1c, however, peripheral information sharing on 
the part of account managers did not affect peripheral knowledge transfer from colleagues, as 
the path in question is non-significant (β=-0.03, t=-0.64). 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 Next, turning to the findings for instrumental investments, we discover that the 
communication of reciprocity norms influences strategic information sharing (γ=0.39, t=4.72) 
and implementation support (γ=0.34, t=4.11); and strategic information sharing, in turn, also 
affects implementation support (β=.21, t=2.87). Therefore, hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c are 
supported. 
 Hypotheses 3 addresses the reciprocal relationships between the two outcomes of social 
bonds: peripheral knowledge accretion was predicted to influence implementation support, and 
implementation support, in turn, was forecast to influence peripheral knowledge accretion. Both 
paths received support: peripheral knowledge accretion affected implementation support (β=.22, 
t=1.99), and implementation support influenced peripheral knowledge accretion (β=.25, t=2.00). 
 Finally, both social capital outcomes were expected to have an impact on performance. 
The results show that peripheral knowledge accretion (β=.16, t=2.88) and implementation 
support (β=.25, t=4.31) both influenced performance. Hence, hypothesis H4 is supported. 
Tests of rival hypotheses 
The hypotheses developed in this paper, as reflected in Figure 1, constitute relatively 
specific propositions in the sense that particular predictions for mediation are made.  To test for 
rival hypotheses in the sense of direct, non-mediated effects, not specified in Figure 1, we 
investigated all such paths in a set of four collections of predictions presented below. 
To verify whether the communication of reciprocity norms and the sharing of strategic 
information affect peripheral knowledge accretion, we tested a model with paths added from 
communication of reciprocity norms, as well as from sharing of strategic information, to 
peripheral knowledge accretion. In Table 2 model M2 presents the findings. None of the new 
paths was found to be significant. Thus, it can be concluded that implementation support fully 
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mediates the effects of instrumental investments (i.e., communication of reciprocity norms and 
strategic sharing) on peripheral knowledge accretion.  
Secondly, we added paths from the four dimensions of citizenship behaviors, as well as 
from peripheral information sharing, to implementation support to test whether antecedents of 
peripheral knowledge influence the attainment of implementation support. The results are given 
in M3 in Table 2. The chi-square difference test shows that the rival model with added paths 
does not fit significantly better than the baseline model; interestingly though, we found one of 
the paths to be barely significant: courtesy negatively affected implementation support (β=-0.17, 
t=-1.97). Therefore, we may conclude that peripheral knowledge transfer mediates (most of) the 
effects of communal investments on implementation support. The primary effects of communal 
investment reside in civic virtue and sportsmanship (enhancing peripheral knowledge) as well as 
courtesy (facilitating peripheral sharing and compromising implementation support). 
Next we added paths from peripheral sharing and the OCBs to performance. Model M4 
presents the findings in Table 2. It can be seen that none of the 5 direct paths is significant. 
Therefore, given also the results summarized in Figure 1, we may conclude that peripheral 
knowledge accretion fully mediates the effects of civic virtue and sportsmanship on 
performance, and peripheral information sharing has neither direct nor indirect effects on 
performance. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Finally, we added paths from strategic sharing and communication of reciprocity norms 
to performance. Model M5 in Table 2 presents the results, where it can be observed that neither 
of the 2 paths is significant. Hence, given also the findings displayed in Figure 1, we may 
conclude that implementation support fully mediates the effects of strategic sharing and 
reciprocity norms on performance. 
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 In sum, the results in Figure 1 and the tests of the tests of rival hypotheses summarized in 
Table 2 provide support for the hypotheses developed in this paper. Further, the data are 
consistent with the mediational mechanisms implied by Figure 1. 
Discussion  
Account managers’ social capital is the goodwill of colleagues within their organization to 
share resources, and it depends on the motivations that account managers have and the prior 
investments that they make. The authors proposed a task-contingent approach of social capital 
because of the way the resources are distributed in the firm. Account managers seek peripheral 
knowledge that is distributed throughout the firm to ensure that their vision during product 
framing for the customer conforms to the organizational practices stored in narratives and 
metaphors that are told and used in the firm. In order to implement their product visions with 
appropriate quality standards and time constraints, account managers seek implementation 
support to gain access to the time and attention resources of colleagues, which are scarce and 
unequally distributed within the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Both types of social capital 
are needed to achieve goals within the organization, and, in order to attain them, account 
managers have to be in a sense instrumental and altruistic at the same time. Although the two 
types of ties overlap (i.e., the reception of implementation support helps account managers 
accrue peripheral knowledge and vice versa), they are motivated by different investments, and 
access to the ties, in turn, translates into better performance. In what follows, we first discuss the 
findings more closely, then focus on managerial and research implications. 
First, account managers gain access to peripheral information by partaking in OCBs, which 
signal a communal motivation and thus create a specific climate conducive to promoting open 
exchanges. Interestingly, specific types of OCBs led either to sharing or attainment of peripheral 
information. For our particular context of account management, sportsmanship and civic virtue 
directly lead to knowledge accretion, whereas courtesy promotes the sharing of peripheral 
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information with colleagues by account managers. Unexpectedly, helping did not have a 
significant effect on either peripheral information sharing or peripheral knowledge accretion. 
One reason for this might be that when account managers help their colleagues, the focus is on 
task-oriented activities, unlike for the other dimensions of OCB, which are nonpurposive in 
nature (e.g., MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter 1991; Podsakoff and MacKenzie 1994). In such a 
climate of “getting things done”, the exchange of stories is not particularly germane. Therefore 
helping, per se, might not be conducive to stimulating information flow. Similarly, the sharing 
of peripheral information by account managers did not lead to peripheral knowledge accretion in 
our study. It is likely that different OCBs are efficacious in different organizations, depending 
on the particular employees and knowledge. It seems that account managers and their colleagues 
engage in what Brown and Duguid (1998) call the “knowledge generation dance”, implying that 
during interactions account managers and colleagues profit from, add to, and stretch the 
organizational knowledge base (see also, Bannon and Kutti 1996). This phenomenon is aptly 
described by Brown and Duguid (1991, p. 47) as follows:  “In telling stories an individual rep 
contributes to the construction and development of his or her identity as a rep and reciprocally to 
the construction and development of the community of reps in which he or she works”. 
Second, somehow unexpectedly the sharing of peripheral information by the account 
manager did not elicit similar activities by colleagues. In this regard, peripheral information 
transfer from colleagues did not follow a reciprocal logic, instead it was triggered exclusively by 
communal motivations. Peripheral knowledge accretion hence seems to follow a spontaneous 
process, which can be stimulated indirectly through the creation of a communal atmosphere, 
particularly by engaging in OCBs. Account managers’ sharing of peripheral information on the 
other hand proved to be of no value either for the attainment of social capital or the achievement 
of sales goals. 
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Third, the exchange regime of the implementation ties clearly was instrumentally 
motivated for the context under study. In taking a boundary-spanning stance, account managers 
signaled a sort of toughness to their colleagues via the expression of specific exchange rules. 
This suggests that account managers are willing to share strategic investments (information) 
with colleagues who, in turn, reciprocate this behavior by providing implementation support. In 
addition, the resource dependent position of colleagues on account manager’s ties in and of itself 
motivates them to give support. Bonoma (1985) expressed a similar interpretation of how 
support ties operate within firms:   
“The final characteristic of effective interactors was an implicit understanding of the nature 
of relationships as characterized by exchange, tit-for-tat, trading of utility, and other “social 
market value” characteristics. No matter how expressed, whether as “there ain’t no free 
lunch” or “you give and you get,” it was implicitly understood and acted upon by the good 
interactors that compromise, logrolling, and the principles of exchange are what dominate 
management life” (Bonoma 1985, p. 133-134). 
Fourth, via accretion of peripheral knowledge and the attainment of implementation 
support, social capital eventually becomes transformed into better performance. This finding 
illustrates that access to networks and their specific resources are vital for successful 
performance. Although such researchers as Woodcock (1998) and Ibarra (1992) have suggested 
that goal accomplishment will be enhanced when portfolios of different social ties are cultivated, 
specific hypotheses have not been tested in this regard. Our study is one of the first to 
investigate such processes in marketing. However, although we did use managerial performance 
evaluations for our validations of the model, we did not explicitly investigate whether account 
managers’ performance fit company goals. It is possible, for instance, that account managers 
might claim resources from colleagues, and these resources might flow to customers with little 
or no strategic relevance for the company (Whitney 1996). For similar reasons, organizations 
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introduce account management systems to better allocate resources to key customers (Homburg 
et al. 2002).   
Fifth, when account managers invest in courtesy, it actually inhibits their ability to attain 
implementation support, and thus overly investing in courtesy reflects sunk costs. This finding 
shows that the creation of a communal environment does not motivate colleagues to share their 
scarce time and attention resources; on the contrary, the more account managers engage in 
courtesy, the less they are capable of attaining implementation support. Two specific reasons for 
this can be put forward: 1) by engaging in courtesy a person enmeshes him/herself into the 
organization, whereas seeking implementation support is based upon pursuing one’s own 
individual goals, and 2) by discussing one’s impact on others, the signaling of exchange norms 
and the sharing of strategic information become blurred, and colleagues might not appreciate the 
message. That is, account managers might be conceived as persons who are too nice and unable 
to signal toughness. We caution that the coefficient found supporting the above mentioned 
negative effect of courtesy was barely significant. 
Given that communal and instrumental investments had additive effects in our study, this 
would seem to suggest a somewhat ambidextrous view of the way account managers accomplish 
goals. This study shows the complexity of gaining social capital: social capital consists of two 
different types of social ties, which are driven by differently motivated investments. Account 
managers have to learn to integrate these two signaling methods, and both methods might be 
characterized as a person’s “network-competence”. “Competence” implies that account 
managers purposively seek to master and integrate seemingly incongruous skills, such that they 
can handle conflicting situations and accomplish their goals. In this regard, Erickson (1997) 
speaks about an agentive and self-directed process, Weitz and Bradford (1999) talk about the 
ability for initiation (controlling) and enhancement (maintaining relationships). The 
psychological literature supports a somewhat similar idea with the construct of androgyny, that 
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is, combining and expressing both so-called ‘male’ and ‘female’ attributes (Bem, 1974, 1979). 
Account managers who possess this ability might be both empathic and instrumental at the same 
time. But how should account managers who only possess one or the other of the two 
motivations accomplish this?  
Altruistic account managers in the sense of conducting OCBs might be able to embed 
themselves easily within the organization. But in our study, OCBs and the communication of 
reciprocity norms were uncorrelated (see Table 1). Indeed, as Bacharach et al. (2000) have 
shown, people with a communal motivation might be good at immersing themselves into their 
social environment (organization) but subsequently might “loose themselves”, because they are 
unable to create appropriate boundaries between themselves and others. Even if altruistic 
account managers were able to learn how to effectively signal exchange norms under conditions 
where network partners are resource dependent on them, they might still experience mixed 
feelings. Exline and Lobel (1999), for instance, show that people who achieve dominance often 
feel guilty. They are afraid of appearing too successful to colleagues they feel united with, 
fearing to provoke envy and other negative reactions. Learning how to integrate communal and 
instrumental tactics poses challenges for account managers. 
What about account managers who have clear instrumental motivations but lack altruistic 
motivations? Such account managers should be able to handle the resource dependence of 
interaction partners relatively easily. But helping such managers also develop communal skills 
may prove to be difficult. Bolino (1999) notes that if account managers display OCBs for 
impression purposes, interaction partners may become suspicious and feel that their altruistic 
behavior is artificial, if they detect insincerity or ulterior motives.  
Future research  
Four issues for future research deserve particular attention. First, although we conceived of 
social capital as a mechanism for achieving goals, it is also possible that the operation of social 
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capital has additional side benefits. Account managers who perform well often stand-out and 
attract the attention of colleagues (Gilbert, 1990). This leads people to want “to join a winning 
team”, because it fosters success and greater identification in their own professional work. 
Colleagues joining the band-wagon so to speak may be willing to provide more implementation 
support (and to a certain extent also share peripheral information). A longitudinal study is 
needed that unravels the mechanisms showing how account managers’ performance and social 
capital relate to each other over time.  
Second, it is possible that account managers might seek to attain resources in ways that do 
not aid their organization. For instance, some account managers might be very successful in 
attaining implementation support, but it might come at the cost of other account managers. This 
might mean that customers of the disadvantaged account managers might become dissatisfied, 
and the firm will be hurt. 
Third, account managers’ use of exchange norms in their search for resources might lead 
to unethical behaviors, a warning made by Achrol and Kotler (1999). It is perhaps only a small 
step from signaling exchange norms to signaling threats to colleagues, if they do not cooperate 
or provide implementation support. Threats might be used for one’s personal gain and not the 
firm’s, especially for those with Machiavellian tendencies. This is one reason why firms 
nowadays have introduced account management systems and ethical guidelines as 
institutionalized ways to manage the resource allocation processes. Furthermore, because 
accounts often represent large customers, and thus are vital to the organization, top management 
should become involved in setting guidelines on how account managers should share and 
receive resources. Organizations therefore should make resource sharing public events, and not 
be left to the personal agendas of account managers (a similar point is made by Kostova and 
Roth 2003). This is to ensure that cooperation and competition will be functional within the firm 
(Katz and Koenig 2001).  
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Finally, we suggested that account managers should share strategic information to build 
social capital in the form of implementation support, and those investments are clearly 
instrumentally motivated. But having such motivation might not be enough. Account managers 
also have to possess practical intelligence or “street-smarts” (Sternberg and Wagner 1986). Of 
particular concern is “shaping ability”. That is, an important element of practical intelligence is 
the ability to adjust the environmental context to be more in line with one’s resources, and to 
change the customer’s values and priorities by managing the context or information flow that is 
provided to the customer (Sujan 1999). The process of shaping then involves conscious efforts 
to change the context of the selling situation through acquiring and disseminating strategic 
information via social ties or interpersonal communication. Similarly, account managers might 
use their shaping ability on their colleagues. This further deepens, however, the existing 
information asymmetry between account managers and their colleagues.  
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Appendix: List of scales 
Social Capital 
Peripheral knowledge accretion 
When I ask for it, others in my organization easily provide me knowledge about their specific 
department  
Almost everybody easily shares information with me about the way we do things in my 
organization  
Almost everybody easily shares information with me about important matters in our 
organization. 
 
Implementation support  
In order to get something done in my organization I can surround myself by the better people in 
the organization.  
I easily surround myself with the suitable (proper) people such that I can get things done 
I know how to motivate others such that I can finish up projects.   
 
Communal Investments 
1. Peripheral information sharing 
I easily share the information that I attain about the things going on in my organization with 
almost everybody in my organization.  
I easily share the information that I attain about my organization with most of my colleagues.  
 
2. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
Civic virtue 
I “keep up” with developments in the organization. 
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I attend functions that are not required, but that help the organization image. 
I read and keep up with the organization’s announcements, messages, memos, etc. 
Sportsmanship 
I consume a lot of time complaining about trivial matters. 
I tend to make problems bigger than they are. 
I always focus on what is going wrong with my situation, rather than the positive side of it. 
I always find fault with what the organization is doing.  
Helping 
I help orient new colleagues even though it is not required.  
I am always ready to help or to lend a helping hand to those around me. 
I willingly give of my time to help others.  
Courtesy 
I respect other people’s rights to common/shared resources (including clerical help, materials, 
etc.). 
I consider the impact of my actions on others. 
I “touch base” with others (inform them in advance) before initiating actions that might affect 
them. 
I try to avoid creating problems for others. 
 
Instrumental Investments 
1. Strategic information sharing  
When it strengthens my position within the organization, I give information to specific persons.  
I share information with my colleagues in order to facilitate the realization of my visions or 
strategy  
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When I think that I can influence the way my organization operates, then I will share the 
necessary information with my colleagues.  
 
2. Communication of reciprocity norms  
I do not simply share my information with everybody, I think: tit for tat!  
If I have done something for another person, I can easily say, “now it is your turn”.  
I am a bit known as the “dealmaker” within my organization  
 
 
Performance 
Compared to the average account manager in the firm, I score [(1) ‘very low’ to (7) ‘very high’] 
in… 
producing a high market share for my organization in my territory. 
selling products with a high profitability. 
generating a high level of dollar sales. 
quickly generating sales of new products. 
identifying and selling to major accounts in my territory. 
selling long-term contracts. 
exceeding sales targets for my territory during the year. 
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   TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliabilities 
Variable                  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Peripheral 
 information  
    sharing 
(.76)a          
2. Strategic 
 information 
    sharing 
.11 (.65)         
3. Peripheral 
    knowledge 
 accretion 
.01 .11 (.86)        
4. Implementation 
    support 
.10 .33** .47** (.80)       
5. Reciprocity 
    norms 
.04 .35** .17 .40** (.63)      
6. Civic 
    virtue 
-.03 .08 .33** .14 .08 (.67)     
7. Sportsmanship -.11 .06 -.32** -.15 -.01 -.29** (.79)    
8. Helping .08 .16* .23 .10 -.02 .46** -.15 (.75)   
9. Courtesy .29** .02 .08 -.07 .00 .32** -.10 .39** (.73)  
10. Performance .06 .17* .38** .44** .22** .21** -.26** .04 -.08 (.83) 
Mean 4.48 5.17 5.58 5.25 4.57 5.72 2.81 5.48 5.35 4.93 
Std. Dev. 1.50 0.96 1.07 1.01 .86 .75 1.11 .90 .83 .75 
a Reliability coefficients are displayed in parentheses on the diagonal. 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
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TABLE 2: Tests of alternative models 
Model  Fit Index Test of hypothesis and 
conclusion 
M1 Baseline (Figure 1) χ2 (23) = 30.95, 
p=.12 
CFI=.97 
TLI=.94 
RMSEA=.05 
Model in Figure 1 is consistent 
with the data. 
M2 Added paths from reciprocity 
norms and from strategic 
information sharing to 
peripheral knowledge 
accretion. 
χ2 (21) = 29.00, 
p=.11 
M2 – M1:  χ2d (2) = 1.95; p=.38 
Instrumental motivation does 
not affect peripheral 
information sharing or 
knowledge accretion directly. 
M3 Added paths from OCBs and 
from peripheral information 
sharing to implementation 
support. 
χ2 (18) = 22.84, 
p=.20 
M3 – M1:  χ2d (5) = 8.11; p=.15 
Communal motivation and 
peripheral information sharing 
do not affect implementation 
support directly. 
M4 Added paths from peripheral 
information sharing and 
OCBs to performance. 
χ2 (18) = 21.10, 
p=.27 
M4 – M1:  χ2d (5) = 9.85; p=.08 
Peripheral information sharing 
and OCBs do not affect 
performance directly. 
M5 Added paths from strategic 
information sharing and from 
communication of reciprocity 
norms to performance. 
χ2 (21) = 30.37, 
p=.09 
M5 – M1:  χ2d (2) = .58; p=.75 
Strategic information sharing 
and reciprocity norms do not 
affect performance directly. 
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Figure 1.  Findings for Structural Equation Model 
 
 
 
Antecedents - 
communal investments: Social Capital: 
Peripheral information sharing 
R2=.12 
Civic virtue 
Sportsmanship 
Helping  
.60** 
(.33) 
Courtesy 
Peripheral knowledge accretion
R2=.30 
.27**(.19) 
-.22**(-.23)
.11(.09)
-.01(-.01)
-.34 (-.17) -.17
(-.12).02 
(.01) 
Antecedents - 
instrumental investments: 
Performance 
R=.23 
Strategic 
information sharing 
R2=.12 
.25**(.34)
.25**
(.24)
.16**(.22)
.22** 
(.23) 
Implementation support 
R2=.32 
Communication of 
reciprocity norms 
.34**(.29) 
.21**(.20) 
.39**(.35) 
-.03(-.05) 
Consequences: 
 Note:  Unstandardized parameters not in parentheses, standardized parameters in parentheses. (**p < .01) 
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